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SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL AND THE
CONSTITUTION
G. Calvin Mackenzie*
I.

INTRODUCION

In May of 1980, George J. Mitchell took the oath of office that all
United States Senators have taken since 1868:
I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.
So help me God.'
The fourteen and one-half years of Mitchell's Senate service were a
time of institutional and political tumult. For only two and one-half
of those years were the Congress and the presidency controlled by
the same party; only in those same two and one-half years did
Mitchell serve with a President who was a member of his own party.
The unsurprising result of this partisan division of institutional
control was constant skirmishing, not only on substantive policies,
but over the structure and meaning of the Constitution itself. During George Mitchell's time in Washington, the parties adopted institutional identities. Republicans had controlled the presidency for
most of the period after World War II and had come to view presidential power and prerogative as the point of their partisan lance.
Democrats had maintained their power base in Congress, especially
in the House of Representatives, since 1930. They had come to regard the Legislature as home turf, jealously guarding it against executive encroachment and seeking constantly to expand its realm.
These were times that tested the meaning and strained the application of the Constitution like few others in our history. When the
presidency is controlled by one party and Congress by the other,
how is war to be made? Who bears responsibility for constructing
the annual budget? How should the Senate advise and consent on
appointments? And what substantive rights should the Constitution
* G. Calvin Mackenzie is the Distinguished Presidential Professor of American
Government and Chairman of the Government Department at Colby College. Dr.
Mackenzie is a graduate of Bowdoin College with a Ph.D. from Harvard University
and is a specialist on American political institutions. His books include The Politics
of Presidential Appointments, The House at Work, The In-and-Outers, and The
Politics of American Government. He has served as consultant to both houses of
Congress.
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protect: the right to pray in schools? the sanctity of the flag? the life
of a fetus?
The Congress and the President wrestled with all of these questions during George Mitchell's time in the Senate. And on all of
them, Mitchell was a leading wrestler. This Article will examine a
number of the most important constitutional issues that came before
the Senate from 1980 through 1994. It will explore the positions
George Mitchell took on those issues and seek to identify from his
words and actions the constitutional philosophy that guided George
Mitchell's personal efforts to "support and defend the Constitution
of the United States." It will focus primarily on the controversies in
which Mitchell participated most actively: the Iran-Contra investigation, the war powers debate, various confirmation struggles, and
proposals to amend the Constitution itself.
II. THi IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
George Mitchell first came to national prominence as a member
of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. This was a special Senate investigating committee established to review the covert simultaneous
efforts of leading figures in the Reagan Administration to secure the
release of American hostages in Iran and to support the Contra
resistance in Nicaragua. The most dramatic moments in the special
committee's investigation occurred during the testimony of Lt. Col.
Oliver North, United States Marine Corps, a former member of the
President's National Security Council staff. North admitted a series
of deceits, including lying to Congress, but defended his deeds as a
valiant quest in the national interest, as acts of patriotism. This inspired the best "sound bite" from the hearings, when George Mitchell, the junior senator from Maine, reminded the witness of
patriotism's alternative meanings.
Although He's regularly asked to do so, God does not take
sides in American politics. And, in America, disagreement
with the policies of the government is not evidence of lack of
patriotism.
Indeed, it is the very fact that Americans can criticize their
government openly and without fear of reprisal that is the essence of our freedom, and that will keep us free?
But there were more than mere sound bites to the Iran-Contra
investigation. It raised some critical constitutional issues, and on
these Mitchell took sides as well.
2. Iran-ContraInvestigation-"Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Selected Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 46 (1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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Throughout the decades following World War II, the Congress
and the President have jousted over the meaning of the Constitution's War Powers Clause.3 The Constitution was written long
before America became a superpower with millions of men and women in uniform, even in peacetime. The simple words that grant
Congress the power to declare war and the President the duties of
commander-in-chief ill fit the realities of the modem world. The
Iran-Contra contretemps was a striking demonstration of this.
Defenders of the initiatives of President Reagan's aides noted
that covert action, flexibility, and quick and opportunistic responses
are often essential to secure advantage in complex foreign undertakings. Critics, however, saw in these actions little more than a circumvention of established procedure and existing law to implement
a particular set of policy views. Flexibility versus control: this was a
tension as old as the Republic. As "Publius" wrote in The Federalist, "In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself."' That is the issue that haunted the Iran-Contra
hearings: how does a government control itself without robbing
those charged with implementing policy of all flexibility?
For George Mitchell, the answer is this: when flexibility and accountability are in conflict, accountability ultimately must prevail.
In the memoir they jointly authored, Mitchell and Senator William
S. Cohen wrote:
The selective use of "nonappropriated" funds to carry out undisclosed activities struck at the very core of government accountability, one of the fundamental tenets of the
Constitution.
In the final analysis, the Iran-Contra affair remains a story
about power-who has it, in what measure and how it is to be
exercised. The Founding Fathers decided that power necessarily had to be "entrusted to someone, but that no one could be
trusted with power." History and experience taught them that
power unchecked led to its arrogant use and inevitable abuse,
and so they diffused5 it deliberately and set up institutional
checks and balances.
For Mitchell, the Iran-Contra initiative crossed the line. This was
not merely the action of an Administration within the scope of its
authority to seize a foreign policy advantage. It was a conscious deceit, designed to circumvent the law and to avoid the scrutiny its
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Tudor Publishing Co., 1937).
5. WILLIAM S. COHEN & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL:
SIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CoNTRA HEARINGS 308-09 (1988).

A

CANDID IN-
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actions could not withstand. The Constitution, in Mitchell's view,
permitted no such evasion of accountability. "A democratic nation,
based on the rule of law and respect for that law," he reminded his
Senate colleagues, "cannot long remain democratic if its government officials are not accountable to that law."6
Later, the Iran-Contra investigation raised another constitutional
question. The Independent Counsel investigating these activities
began to seek indictments in 1988 of some of the leading participants. Rumors began to float that President Reagan might issue
preemptive pardons to protect his former aides from judicial proceedings. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution empowers the
President to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States." It remains unclear, however, whether such language
permits a President to issue pardons in advance of formal charges or
findings of guilt. President Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon in
advance of any formal charges for crimes the latter may have committed as President, but that exercise of the pardon power did not
settle the question in the minds of many.
George Mitchell was one of those who worried about the potential for perfidy in the use of preemptive pardons. In Mitchell's view:
It would be a dangerous insult to our judicial system to
shortcircuit its truthfinding processes, to embrace, not merely
the presumption of innocence, to which every defendant is entitled, but a final, unappealable decision of innocence after indictment but before a jury has acted.
There is and can be no justification, after an indictment has
been returned, to allow those who served close to a President
to avoid the judicial process in a manner that is not available
to any other citizen.
Neither the aides of powerful figures,
7 nor powerful figures
themselves, should be above the law.
This theme recurs in many of Mitchell's statements on constitutional issues. We have one law, the same for all citizens. All Americans, from the meekest to the mightiest, must be equal before that
law. Justice evaporates when status and power impair the equal application of the law.
II.

WAR POWERS

The Iran-Contra investigation was not the only forum in which
the Congress and the President battled over war powers during
George Mitchell's years in the Senate. In fact, the debate was a constant of those years. While no wars were declared during this period, American forces were engaged in hostile action abroad in
6. 133 CONG. REC. S5945 (daily ed. May 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
7. 134 CONG. REC. S7821 (daily ed. June 15, 1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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Grenada, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, and
Haiti. These were precisely the kinds of situations for which the
War Powers Act was designed.' In each case, the President
deployed American forces without seeking a declaration of war. In
almost every case, some members of Congress complained that the
President had not adequately consulted with Congress as required
by the War Powers Act.
Like many of his colleagues, Mitchell recognized, and often
noted, the confusion created by the potentially contradictory language of the Constitution on the issue of war. "The writers of the
Constitution," he once noted, "correctly reasoned that if power
were sufficiently dispersed, no institution or individual could gain
total power. Nowhere has their concept been more severely tested
than in what they regarded as one of the greatest powers of government-the power to make war."9
But Mitchell struck an independent course on how this confusion
might best be resolved. For many of his colleagues, especially Democrats, the answer was closer presidential adherence to the consultation requirements of the War Powers Act. While Mitchell believed
that any president was obliged to follow the law, he was much troubled by the War Powers Act. His reading of the debates of 1787
reminded him that the framers of the Constitution had initially
given Congress the power to "make" war, then had backed off and
decided only to grant the Congress power to "declare" war. To
Mitchell this suggested an intent to grant the President the authority
to determine when and how American forces should be used in the
national interest.
In Mitchell's view, the congressional power to declare war is limited in two ways that many of his colleagues were unwilling to admit.
First, Mitchell argued, "[N]ot every hostile situation, not every dangerous circumstance-even those which may involve death and destruction of property-is war."'" The authority inherent in the
power to declare war simply does not apply to every hostile action.
Because these are not wars, the language of the war making clause is
not triggered. Second, in Mitchell's view the "War Powers Resolution actually expands Congress' authority beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit troop deployment .... "I'
Often in his congressional tenure, Mitchell questioned the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. He urged presidents to initiate a
legal challenge to the Act, to permit the federal courts to rule on its
constitutionality and thereby settle the issue. In 1988, he offered a
8.
9.
10.
11.

50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1988).
137 CONG. Rac. S101 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
133 CONG. REc. S13327 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
134 CONG. REC. S6177 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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proposal of his own1 2 to fix some of the constitutional defects of the
War Powers Act. Mitchell generally opposed unchecked military
adventurism. In fact, he was among the minority of senators who
opposed the resolution that supported President Bush's use of force
in Kuwait in 1991. But neither was he a fan of what he regarded as
dubious statutory bending of the Constitution, even when it
strengthened the congressional hand-and his views-in debates on

military policy and strategy.
IV.

CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS

During Mitchell's tenure, the Senate and Presidents Bush and
Reagan engaged in several intense conflicts over appointments. In
the immediate aftermath of Watergate, the Senate had taken on a
new demeanor in performing its constitutional obligation to advise
and consent on appointments. Willingness to question and oppose
the President's nominees became more common. Senate committees beefed up their investigating staffs and undertook more comprehensive examinations of nominees' backgrounds and policy
views. Videotape and computerized data bases like NEXIS and
LEXIS made it easier than ever to review a nominee's past writings
and statements. And the proliferation of special interest groups in
Washington heightened the political stakes of appointment
controversies.
The central questions for the Senate were these: how large a role
should the Senate play in staffing the judicial and executive
branches and what criteria should it apply in passing judgment on
the nominees it was asked to confirm. On these questions George
Mitchell had clear and strong views.
The Senate's role, it seemed to him, was to participate actively in
appointment decisions. While the President was constitutionally obligated and entitled to take the initiative by proposing nominees, the
Senate was not consigned to the role of passive follower. Mitchell
said:
Under the Constitution the President has the prerogative to
nominate Cabinet members. That does not mean, however,
that the Senate's role in the confirmation process is automatically to approve each Presidential nominee. The Senate must
evaluate the nominee's behavior and standards as well
13 as his
ability to discharge properly the duties of the office.
Mitchell later reiterated:
I cannot accept the thesis that the President is entitled to
have whomever he wishes for positions which require the advice and consent of the United States Senate. If we are not
12. 134 CONG. REC. S6238 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
13. 135 CONG. REC. S1880 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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supposed to exercise our judgment about the best interests of
our country then we need to take that provision out of the
Constitution.14
Although Senator Mitchell voted against appointments to the executive branch when he felt it appropriate to do so, it was appointments to the judicial branch that inspired a special sense of
obligation on Mitchell's part. Judicial appointments, in his view, demand active Senate participation. "The reasons for that are clear,"
he said during the debate on Robert Bork's Supreme Court
nomination:
The Supreme Court is one of the three governing institutions
of this country. Only at the time of confirmation is there any
opportunity for the public, through Congress and the President, to have any influence on the Court.
The constitutional role of the Senate is as an equal particito the judiciary. The
pant with the President in appointments
15
Senate is not a rubber stamp.
This is an unusually expansive view of the Senate's confirmation
power. Even Alexander Hamilton, who defended this provision of
the Constitution in The Federalistoffered a narrower construction of
the Senate's role:
[O]ne man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a
body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment
....
In the act of nomination, [the President's] judgment
alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to
point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate,
should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as
if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this
16
view, be no difference between nominating and appointing.
What criteria should senators apply in making their confirmation
decisions? On this question, too, Mitchell spoke often. George
Bush's 1989 nomination of former Texas Senator John Tower to be
Secretary of Defense posed special problems for Mitchell and many
of his Senate colleagues. Rarely had the Senate denied the President the freedom to select members of his own cabinet; the last defeated cabinet nomination had been in 1959. In addition, Mr. Tower
had served for more than two decades in the Senate prior to his
nomination, and the Senate had a long habit of treating current and
former colleagues with kid gloves. Beyond that, President Bush was
newly elected and still in what traditionally has been regarded as the
"honeymoon period" of his administration.
14. 135 CONG. REc. S2457 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
15. 133 CONG. REc. S13820 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
16. Tim FEDERALisT No. 76, at 87, 88-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing Co., 1937).
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The Tower nomination, however, was deeply troubling to many
senators. Tower had acquired a reputation for womanizing and alcohol abuse. Since leaving the Senate a few years prior to his nomination, he had worked as a consultant and lobbyist for defense
companies. Additionally, while in the Senate, he often had made
enemies of his colleagues by treating them peremptorily.
Mitchell led off the debate on the Tower nomination with a
thoughtful disquisition on the role of the Senate in the appointment
process and the criteria that ought to be applied to nominations like
Tower's. He reviewed the debates of the framers and quoted from
scholars. He concluded that the historical record offered little specific guidance to senators.
No universally accepted criteria for judging fitness for public office exist. No standards were established by law or are
contained within the Constitution to guide Senators. Ultimately, the decision is subjective, an individual Senator's judgment of the qualifications and suitability of the nominee.
Difficult though that may be for us, it is clearly what the framers of the Constitution intended.' 7
Then he stated the general criteria he believed most appropriate:
conflict of interest, character and integrity, professional competence
and experience.' 8
But another issue troubled Mitchell in the Tower appointment
controversy and in other cases that occurred during his Senate years.
Is it proper for the Senate to inquire about and pass judgment on
the policy views and philosophy of a nominee? The conventional
wisdom and the weight of historical tradition suggested that the Senate's role was to assess the fitness of the nominee on matters of
character, integrity, and preparation but that policy views were an
inappropriate basis for casting a confirmation vote.
Mitchell disagreed with this constrained view of the Senate's latitude in choosing its own criteria, but he drew a fine line between
including a nominee's policy views in the criteria for judgment and
relying solely on that criterion. Mitchell expressed the view that
senators should consider nominees' policy views and philosophy as
part of a broad determination of their fitness for confirmation, but
should not base their judgments solely on whether or not they
agreed with a nominee on policy matters. He believed it especially
important to consider the philosophies of judicial nominees because
of the importance and endurance of their decisions. In the debate
on Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, Mitchell said:

17. 135 CONG. Rnc. S2458 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).

18. Id
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[The President] cannot fairly use ideology as a factor in
making nominations and then criti[ci]ze Senators for using
ideology as a factor in considering his nominations. His right
to pick nominees politically is uncontested. He has exercised
that right repeatedly. But he cannot then fairly accuse others
of politicizing a process
which he has made openly political
19
from the beginning.
During the debate on Clarence Thomas's nomination to the
Supreme Court in 1991, Mitchell restated the argument:
The President selects nominees because of their views, not
despite them. That is his privilege. It is the reward of election
to the Presidency. He is answerable for the quality of his
choices only to the voters and history .... It is illogical and
untenable to suggest that the President has the right to select
someone because of that person's views and then to say the
Senate has no right to reject that person because of those very
same views.2 °

George Mitchell often voted against the nominees of the Republican Presidents with whom he served-against Bork, Thomas, and
Tower, and others as well. He voted against Robert Gates's nomination to head the CIA and against William Rehnquist's promotion
from Associate Justice to Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Mitchell's fierce partisanship obviously inspired
these decisions; there is no record of him voting against Carter or
Clinton nominees. He sought, however, to lay an intellectual foundation for his votes against confirmation and to fit them to his view
of the Senate-a view that considered the Senate an important partner in the task of staffing the executive and judicial branches of
government.
V.

AMENDING THE CONSTITUrION

George Mitchell served in the Senate during a time of constitutional ferment. Just prior to George Mitchell's arrival in Washington, the Senate had voted down a proposal to alter the electoral
college. Shortly after he entered the Senate, the clock ran out on
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. During Mitchell's tenure,
the Senate considered proposed constitutional amendments to overturn the Roe v. Wade abortion decision (1983), permit school prayer
(1984), protect the American flag from desecration (1990), and mandate a balanced federal budget (1982, 1986, 1992, 1994). Mitchell's
positions on these issues tell us something important about his view
of the Constitution.
19. 133 CONG. REc. S14800 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
20. 137 CONG. Rc. S14702-03 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
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Mitchell voted for none of these constitutional amendments. In
part, as one might expect, his votes reflect partisan preferences. His
public statements make it clear that he would have voted for the
Equal Rights Amendment had he been a Senator when it was under
consideration. But Mitchell's reluctance to amend the Constitution
goes beyond mere partisan inclination. His public record suggests a
belief that the Constitution should be amended only as a last resort:
only when an objective is critically important and there is no statutory means of accomplishing it.
Mitchell's votes against the Balanced Budget Amendment have
little to do with his opinions on fiscal issues. Mitchell was fundamentally opposed to budget deficits. But in his view, the place to
accomplish a balanced federal budget was in the budget process, not
the Constitution.
The proponents of this amendment are very vocal about the
political pressures that lead Congress to resist spending cuts.
But they are not willing to be equally open about the political
pressures that lead Congress to engage in charades with our
Constitution .... The fact is that nothing can take the place of
political will. Nor do slogans about balanced budgets take the
place of sensible fiscal policy.21
Mitchell worried about the propriety of enshrining a single economic theory in the Constitution. The Constitution, he said, "is limited to those ideas ... which do not depend on any economic or
social theory to be valid." Then he posed the question that suggested his threshold for any constitutional change, "If a principle is
not good enough to be applicable at all times, does it belong in the
Constitution,
which is intended to endure for all time? I believe
23

not."

There was great political pressure on members of Congress to
support a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution.
Nearly all those who voted against the amendment had to face campaign attacks suggesting that they were against balancing the
budget. In recent years, simple majorities did vote for the amendment in one house or the other. But the amendment process requires a two-thirds vote in both houses, and in each recent instance
enough members were willing to take the political risks necessary to
defend the Constitution from this latest political gimmickry.
George Mitchell was one of those who always voted against the Balanced Budget Amendment.
Nowhere was Mitchell more articulate in defining his view of
what belongs and what does not belong in the Constitution than in
his central role in the flag-burning controversy of 1989-90. In a
21. 128 CONG. REc. S9766 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).

22. 128 CONG. REc. S9763 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
23. Id
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demonstration outside the 1984 Republican National Convention in
Dallas, Gregory L. Johnson had poured kerosene on an American
flag and set it on fire. Then Johnson and some compatriots chanted,
"America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you."' Johnson was
charged with a violation of Texas law protecting venerable objects
from offensive acts. He claimed that his actions were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. In 1989 the U.S. Supreme
Court voted 5-4 to sustain Johnson's claim and to declare the Texas
statute unconstitutional. 25
In rapid response, the Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of
1989 to secure the flag from acts of vandalism.26 This law went into
effect without the signature of President Bush. The President
wanted a constitutional amendment to protect the flag, not a mere
statute, and he declined to sign the law. The new law was quickly
tested, and a case challenging its constitutionality, United States v.
Eichman,27 came to the Supreme Court in 1990. In another 5-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its earlier view that mutilation of the
flag is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.2"
This decision inspired further congressional calls for a constitutional
amendment to protect the flag. In June of 1990, Congress voted on
such an amendment. A majority supported the amendment in both
houses, but in neither house did the majority reach the two-thirds
necessary for approval of a constitutional amendment.
George Mitchell, as Senate majority leader, played a central role
in this debate. He criticized the majority decision of the Supreme
Court in the flag-burning cases. He sought to enact legal protections for the sanctity of the American flag, but he drew a careful
distinction between statutory action and constitutional amendment.
Mitchell sought to craft a law that banned an act-destruction of a
flag-without limiting anyone's right to speak or express views on
any issue. He called this "content-neutral legislation" and distinguished it from legislation designed to suppress opinion.2 9 Why not
a constitutional amendment to accomplish this purpose? Mitchell
answered:
I do not believe we should ever, under any circumstances,
for any reason, amend the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is
so effective in protecting individual liberty of Americans precisely because of its unchanging nature. Once that is unraveled, its effectiveness will be forever diminished.
24. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
25. Id See also TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 42.09 (1989) (statute struck down in
Texas v. Johnson).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989).
27. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

28. Id at 319.
29. 135 CONG. REc. S12598 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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If the Constitution is 30
amended to prohibit the burning of a
flag, where do we stop?
George Mitchell found no more to like in the destruction of the
American flag than he did in budget deficits. But in neither caseindeed, in no case at all during his time in the Senate-did he find it
appropriate to amend the Constitution to solve a policy problem or
correct a disagreeable Supreme Court opinion. The genius of the
American Constitution, in Mitchell's opinion, is not that it is easy to
change but that it holds course so steadily when the winds of change
are blowing. "The Constitution," he has said, "is a relatively brief,
general statement of political and civil rights. For that reason, it has
endured for over two centuries as the principal law for a nation that
has undergone enormous growth and change."'"
VI.

SUMMING UP: GEORGE MrrcHELL AND THE CONsrrrtrION

Historians will be forced to regard the second half of the twentieth century as one of the great watersheds of American political
history. No era has had to struggle more mightily or contentiously
with efforts to redefine individual rights. In no earlier time have the
basic procedures and institutional relationships in government been
in such constant tension. At no other time has the glue of partisan
loyalty so often failed to hold together governing coalitions. Only in
the years preceding the Civil War were stresses on constitutional operations felt so deeply; never have such stresses endured so long.
George Mitchell was at the center of these constitutional debates
for almost fifteen years. During the last six of those years, as majority leader of the United States Senate, he was one of the most influential debate participants. What did he say, what did he believe,
that made a difference?
In George Mitchell's constitutional philosophy, there is a peculiar
mixture of Burkean conservatism and New Deal liberalism. Mitchell believes in the Constitution as a living document, a set of ideas
that should be adapted organically to the evolution of American society and public life. In all of his public statements on the Constitution, he is most eloquent talking about its meaning to the weak, the
dispossessed, and the disadvantaged. For example, Mitchell often
recounted his special pleasure, as a federal judge, in presiding over
citizenship ceremonies.
Ceremonies were always moving for me because my mother
was an immigrant and my father was the orphan son of immigrants. Neither of them had any education and they worked at
very menial tasks in our society. But because of opportunity
30. 136 CONG. REc. S8212 (daily ed. June 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
31. 128 CONG. REc. S9763 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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and equal justice under
law in America, I sit here today a
32
United States Senator.
For Mitchell, the Constitution is a powerful and everlasting source
of hope. It is a bulwark of individual liberties, not only against powerful contemporary majorities but also against the social and economic forces which in so many other countries have kept human
potential shackled in ignorance and poverty.
But Mitchell also finds in the Constitution a set of sturdy principles for government operations. He is a believer in minority rights
but also in majority rule. During his time in the Senate he spoke
often against efforts to thwart the will of political majorities, from
the Senate's filibuster rule to proposed constitutional amendments
that would have required super-majorities to change public policy.
He believed that minorities have rights, and those rights deserve full
protection. But he distinguished between minority rights and minority obstructionism based solely on political or procedural
leverage:
[E]nshrining in the Constitution, the fundamental law of our
Nation, the principle that a minority of elected representatives
can prevent action favored by a majority.., could have a farreaching and incalculable effect on the way this Nation is governed. It tramples the fundamental idea of majority rule.
... Democracy means majority rule, not minority
gridlock.3 3

But just as majorities ought to be able to work their will, so must
they be held accountable for what they do. The need for accountability is a strong and constant theme-a centerpiece-in Mitchell's
constitutional philosophy. "Representative democratic government
depends on accountability. Voters have the right to judge what their
elected officials are doing and the right
34 to vote against them when
they're not pleased, for any reason.,
Another central theme of George Mitchell's constitutional philosophy is an abiding commitment to separation of powers. Mitchell's
time in the Senate was one of constant skirmishing between the executive and legislative branches. Often members of different parties, those in the presidency and Congress, sought to enlarge and
secure their advantage over one another. The advantages they
could not win in elections, Republicans and Democrats sought to
obtain by altering the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches.
32. 133 CONG. Rnc. S10479 (daily ed. July 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
33. 140 CONG. REc. S2155 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
34. George J. Mitchell, Statement Regarding Term Limit Ballot Initiative (Oct.
29, 1993) (transcript available from author).
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Mitchell's role in this struggle for institutional advantage was remarkably unclouded by partisanship. That is no small irony, for
George Mitchell was a passionate partisan. But, time after time, he
spoke for the long view, for enduring values, for the absolute necessity of keeping the branches separate and strong. During the IranContra debate, for example, Mitchell argued:
The men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose the prevention of tyranny .... They succeeded in part
because they divided the central government into three separate, coequal branches among which they dispersed power.
Each has served
as a check on the other. None has become
35
dominant.
In the ongoing controversy over the application of the War Powers Act, Mitchell took a position dictated more by constitutional
philosophy than partisan opportunism. While many Democrats criticized Presidents Reagan and Bush for failing to comply fully with
the consultation requirements of the War Powers Act, George
Mitchell raised grave doubts about the Act's constitutionality.
"[T]he War Powers Resolution actually expands Congress's authority beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit troop
deployment in situations short of war," Mitchell argued, and "therefore threatens...
the delicate balance of power established by the
36
Constitution.
Part of Mitchell's discontent with the Balanced Budget Amendment stemmed from his view that it intruded on the constitutional
separation of powers. "I do not believe it is adequate," he said, "to
enact a constitutional amendment that may entail such a potentially
massive shift in the balance of powers between the executive and

legislative branches.

.. ..

,37

He expressed this view despite the fact

that the shift he criticized would have strengthened the legislative
branch in which his party most often had the upper hand.
Mitchell was consistent in his view that the public interest is best
served when the branches of government are strong and vigorous in
challenging each other. He opposed efforts of one branch-even his
own-to trespass into another's realm of authority. But he felt no
reluctance to exercise to the fullest the authority and responsibility
that properly belonged to the legislative branch, whether in investigating executive misdeeds, opposing presidential appointments, or
proposing statutory corrections of judicial decisions.
In his last year in the Senate, George Mitchell declined a seat on
the United States Supreme Court. Even Republicans who had batfled him for years thought such an appointment an appropriate next
step in Mitchell's career. One could not have observed him day afCOHEN & MrrcHL, supra note 4, at 289.
36. 134 CONG. REc. S6178 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
37. 132 CONG. REc. S3326 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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ter day on the Senate floor, as they had, without gaining an appreciation for Mitchell's reverence for the Constitution and his steady
efforts to protect it from gimmicks, fads, and misuse. On constitutional matters, the liberal partisan often seemed a legal conservative. The classical conservative stands by what works, requiring a
high burden of proof for changes to fundamental ideals. George
Mitchell held this view of the Constitution: "Principles which have
stood that test of time should not be lightly discarded. Liberties that
have seen us through civil wars and world wars should not be tampered with."3 8
When George Mitchell entered the Senate in 1980, he swore an
oath to support and defend the Constitution. Shortly before he left
the Senate, he told his colleagues what he believed that oath meant:
Amending the Constitution ought to be a very serious matter. It should not be used for political cover. It should not be
business as usual. This is not just another bill. This is the Constitution we are talking about.
When we take [sic] our oath of office.... we did not swear
to uphold a particular bill or a particular budget or a particular
economic policy; we swore an oath to uphold the American
Constitution ....
The Constitution is more important than any one of us. Indeed, the39Constitution is more important than all of us put
together.

38. 135
39. 140
Mitchell).

CONG. REc. S13733 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
CONG. REc. S2157-58 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen.

